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Introduction 
 
The famous Danish writer Karen Blixen once described in her story ???????????????, 
???????? ???????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of the dinner with all its imported continental, luxurious, gourmet food and drinks, 
unt??? ???????? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ?? ??????? ????????1 Highly shocked by the unexpected 
expenses of the dinner the guests tell her she will stay poor for the rest of her life 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
relationship to the EU imported project: it is too costly and not worth its price, 
particularly with regard to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). EU 
justice and home affair cooperation is simply not deemed tasty enough as it 
encompasses too many half -­baked dishes.   
 
While there have been many studies of the British and Irish opt out/opt in (pick and 
choose)2 approach to the EU project, Denmark and the Protocol no. 22 as attached to 
the Lisbon Treaty seem to have been largely excluded from this debate on multi-­
speed Europe with regard to crime, anti-­terrorism, security and immigration law. But 
for anyone taking the bridge from Malmö to Copenhagen or otherwise having seen 
the Swedish/Danish TV crime drama The Bridge, the prospect of not having 
Denmark in the AFSJ should cause serious headaches. Malmö might be lawless at 
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
This reflection paper proceeds in three stages. The first section looks at the AFSJ, 
explains what it is and why it could potentially be transformed from an ugly duckling 
into a swan. This part of the paper starts from the presumption that the AFSJ is 
currently going through a highly-­needed transformation in the direction of increased 
legitimacy in terms of the extended jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and extended 
competences to legislate on judicial safeguards. So while the project is still 
characterised by its work-­in-­progress nature, the institutional framework is slowly 
improving. Thereafter, the paper looks at the rules governing differentiation by 
                                                 
* VU Centre for European Legal Studies and Faculty of Law. Email: e.herlinkarnell@vu.nl 
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1 I Dinesen [Karen Blixen] Anecdotes of Destiny, (1958), London: Penguin, 2001. 
2 See e.g. S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011; A. Hinarejos, J. 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Cambridge working paper 2012-??????????????????????-Edged Jigsaw: the Boundaries of Constitutional 
Differentiation and Irish-British-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????The 
Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2012, ch. 7. 
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of the notion of flexibility as such. Secondly it aims to discuss what protocol no. 22 
means for Denmark and the rest of the EU and to what extent this situation differs 
from the UK and Irish opt-­outs. Moreover, the paper briefly assesses the transitional 
????????? ???? ????????? ???????? ???????? ??????????????? ???????????? ???? ???? ??????????
third pillar instruments that are currently still in place despite the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, thereby completing the full removal of the pillars. Finally, the 
paper looks at the Nordic criminal law cooperation template and asks to what extent, 
and how, it differs from the European model. 
 
?. The AFSJ: An Ugly Duckling Project 
 
The AFSJ is one of the fastest-­expanding EU policy areas at present. As such it is a 
very broadly defined field of law governing a wide EU policy area ranging from 
security issues and criminal law to border control and civil law cooperation. The 
AFSJ, previously called Justice and Home Affairs, entered the EU scene in 
connection with the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. With the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????against crime 
were clarified; this created the concept of an AFSJ. While asylum matters, 
immigration and civil law cooperation were moved to the former EC Treaty title IV, 
criminal law cooperation and security remained the hallmark of the third pillar 
regime under Amsterdam.3 However, the third pillar allowed for a limited 
involvement by the European Parliament in the legislative process and could easily 
be criticised for having created a democratic deficit and for a lack of transparency in 
law-­making. More??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
very restricted and based on a voluntary declaration by the Member States to confer 
such jurisdiction (ex Article 35, Treaty of the European Union).4 Therefore, from 
an EU law perspective, the former third pillar framework was never considered to 
be an ideal counterpart to the first pillar (EC) sphere.5 Shortly after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the consequential Tampere Council of 1999 and 
the subsequent Hague programme6 took the notion of an AFSJ space one step 
???????? ??? ???????????? ???? ????????? ??? ???? ????????? ??????? ???????? ??? ? ??????
????????????? ????? ???? ?????? ???????? ????? ???????? ???? ????????? ????????? ??????? ????
development although there has also been extensive legislation in the area, 
particularly in the fields of terrorism, organised crime and illicit drug trafficking, in 
accordance with the relevant provisions. In addition to the Treaty changes, there 
have been a number of important EU council programmes in this area, from the 
abovementioned Tampere conclusions in 1999 to the Stockholm programme 
currently in force until 2014.7 
 
So, as noted, while asylum, immigration and civil law matters fell within the scope of 
the former EC Treaty, criminal law was kept in the third pillar. Yet title IV EC 
(asylum, immigration and civil law cooperation) remained intergovernmental to 
                                                 
3 See Peers 2012, supra note 2, for an extensive overview of the history of the third pillar, ch. 1. 
4 For a comment, ibid., ch. 2. 
5 ??? ????????? ????????? ?????????????????? ?????????????? ??? ???? ??????? Policy-Making in the 
European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010, ch 19. 
6 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????? ??????????????? 
7 2009 The Stockholm programme ? An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizen, 
Council of the European Union, OJ C 115/1 (2010). 
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some extent (developed with the Hague programme in 2004) in the sense that the 
ordinary legislative procedure (qualified majority voting) applied, except when it 
came to legal migration and family law, which remained subject to unanimity in 
council and consultation of the European Parliament.8 In addition, the Court was 
subject to a distinct regime also under the first pillar asylum and immigration 
regime, as its jurisdiction did not go as far as mainstream EC law due to the fact that 
the court was only empowered to receive references from the highest courts in the 
Member States.9  
 
???? ????? ??????? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ????? ????????????? ????????? ???????????????? ????
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (with the exception of the Transitional 
Protocol no. 36 which expires in 2014). Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty constitutes a 
major ? and much needed ? development in the sense that it gives the Court full 
jurisdictional control of the entire AFSJ. This raises challenges, of course, since 
matters of criminal law might be very different as compared to the area of asylum, 
immigration and civil law cooperation. The Court will need to identify a common 
constitutional thread uniting the AFSJ. Nonetheless, the events of 9/11 and the 
repercussions of those terrorist attacks continues to cast a well-­known shadow over 
the AFSJ sphere, due to the numerous legislative measures that were adopted in its 
wake in order to fight terrorism effectively, which did not always guarantee due 
process rights.10 The Lisbon Treaty provides for a whole new conglomerate of 
opportunities with a much more sophisticated framework for analysis and ? most 
importantly ? a better way to adopt legal safeguards for the individual, extended 
jurisdiction of the Court and a legally binding status for the Charter. Hence, the legal 
toolbox is there; it is just the tools that need developing and refining. Perhaps it is 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
into the swan of European law. Such a transformation depends, however, on how 
???????????????rights record in this area will develop and how the EU can achieve 
justice. 
 
??. Flexible Integration and Scandinavian Preferences 
 
???????? ???? ???????? ???? ?????? ???????? ??? ??????? ?? ?????? ???? ????? ???? ???? ????
approach with the possibility of opting out of and then back in to AFSJ matters, the 
Danes have been more drastic in ? what seems at first sight ? saying no to the entire 
project. The development of an AFSJ sphere developed hand in hand with the 
Schengen project which developed outside the Treaty framework. Denmark was the 
first Scandinavian state to join the European venture in 1973 with the rest of the 
Nordic club (Sweden and Finland) joining as late as 1994 (1 January 1995) and 
Norway staying out of the project due to its negative referenda. Only Finland has 
accepted the currency of the euro with the Danes getting an official exception,11 
while Sweden stays out without any real exception in terms of any granted protocol.12 
Iceland has never had any referenda on the EU Treaty, but it enjoys a special 
position together with Norway, defined by the European economic area which came 
                                                 
8 See e.g. Peers 2012, supra note 2, pp. 19-20.  
9 Ibid. 
10 E.g. 2002 The European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision, OJ L 190/1 (2002).  
11 1992 Protocol on Certain Provisions relating to Denmark, annexed to the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, at:  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/institutional_and_economic_f
ramework/l25061_en.htm. 
12 See e.g. F. Snyd?????????? ????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
G. de Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011, p. 687. 
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into force in 1993. In addition, both Norway and Iceland have special arrangements 
with regard to the Schengen acquis.13  
 
These national preferences are sometimes referred to as national identity and 
?????? ??? ??? ??????????????? ??? ??????? ??????? ??????? ?? ??????? ??? ???????????? ???
flexibility, in complying with the EU rule book by not insisting on the one size fits all 
model as usually fostered by the programme of harmonisation. Yet the Nordic, or 
Scandinavian,14 tradition is very similar, with closely tied legal cultures that started off 
as a miniature peace project just like the EU itself. After all, Denmark and Sweden 
are often said to have fought more wars than any other two countries. Today the 
differences between the Scandinavian countries are mostly visible with regard to the 
price as well as attitude towards alcohol, Denmark being the most liberal. The 
Nordic tradition is strong. Not only are the languages almost the same, which the 
exception of Finland, but so is their legal culture, which emerged through regular 
Nordic jurist meetings since 1872.15 Within this fairly homogenous legal culture, the 
need for flexibility is not as urgent as compared to the European law setting. What 
then is flexibility when faced with the EU context?  
 
??.1. The Concept of Flexibility Proper 
 
The notion of flexibility or differentiation is generally described as the facilitation or 
accommodation of a degree of difference between states or regions in relation to what 
??????????????????? ?????????????????????16 Indeed, flexibility as a concept can be 
found throughout the Treaty and could be said to represent codified pluralism.17 The 
EU acquis ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of Member States from the euro zone or the Schengen acquis.18 One could further 
argue that the Treaty-­based exceptions to free movement on the grounds of public 
policy, public health and public security (e.g. Article 36, Treaty of the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) and Article 52 TFEU) also constitute examples of 
???????????????????????????ame manner, the Court-­????????? ???????????????????????????
be further understood within the context of differentiation vis-­à-­vis the permissible 
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Moreover, there are examples of differentiation in the context of different levels of 
harmonisation under the internal market clause of Article 114 (4-­5) TFEU. This 
                                                 
13 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. van Sliedregt, The 
European Arrest Warrant, The Hague: TMC Asser Press 2009, ch 19. 
14 Geographically, the term Scandinavia refers to Sweden, Norway and Denmark, while Finland and Iceland 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????o the terms interchangeably, however. 
15 ??? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Nordic Law ? Between Tradition and Dynamism, Antwerp/Cambridge: Intersentia 2007. 
16 G. de Burca ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
(eds) The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law Antwerp/Cambridge: Intersentia 2003, p. 131. 
17 Discussed further in E. Herlin-????????????????????????????????????e and Many Expressions of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????? Journal of Common Market Studies 1996-????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????Common Market Law Review, 1993, 17; B. De Witte, 
?Old-fashioned Flexibility: International Agreements between Member States of ????????????????????in G. 
de Búrca and J. Scott (eds.), Constitutional Change in the EU, From Uniformity to flexibility? Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2000, p.31. 
18 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Witte, 
D. Hanf and E. Vos (eds) The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law, Antwerp/Cambridge: Intersentia 2003; 
and A. Rosas and L. Armati, EU Constitutional Law Oxford: Hart Publishing 2012, Ch 7. 
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flexibility provision provides for derogations relating to the protection of the 
environment and risk regulation.19  
 
In a??? ?????? ?????????????? ???? ?????????????? ????? ???????? ??? ???? ???????????? ????? ???? ???
more Member States pursue cooperation outside the scope of certain activities within 
???????????? ?????? ??????????20 In short, the notion of enhanced cooperation opens up the 
possibility of flexibility whereby some Member States can go further towards integration than 
other, less integrative-??????? ???????? ??? ???? ????????? ???????? ????? ?????????? ???? ?enhanced 
cooperation is a legal expression of the balancing exercise between making the Union wider and making 
it deeper??21 In the context of the visa information system and the Schengen acquis, 
??????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
of a multi-­speed Europe.22 The Court held that for the coherence of the Schengen 
acquis and the future development of it, Member States are not obliged when they 
develop and deepen the cooperation between them to provide for special adaptation 
measures for other Member States that have not yet taken part in any cooperation.23 
Nonetheless, it should however be noted that the Lisbon Treaty stipulates, following 
the Nice amendments24, that the notion of enhanced cooperation will -­ to the extent 
that it takes place within the framework of this Treaty -­ be open to all Member States 
at all times.25 Despite the importance of multi-­level speed, in the view of the Court, 
there is no obligation for the Member States in question to provide for adaptation 
measures (with regard to the Schengen acquis). Therefore, it remains an open 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
When discussing the concept of differentiation, the starting point is often the 
enhanced cooperation mechanisms as the most clear-­cut example of flexible 
integration.26 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Member States go further than other States. The concept accepts that there is room 
for action outside the EU model and that not all Member States have to be in the 
same boat, while still respecting each other through the fundamental loyalty 
principle of the EU. The notion of enhanced or closer cooperation is an expression 
of flexibility since it offers an alternative model of multi-­speed integration. The 
????????????????????-­????????????????????????????????????????????? the Treaty of 
Prüm27 and the Schengen acquis28, whereby some Member States sought to go 
???????? ????? ?????? ????? ?????????????? ??????? ??????? ?? ????????????? ???? ?????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
by means of the exchange of information, particularly in combatting terrorism, 
                                                 
19 For a recent overview of the different expressions of flexibility in the Lisbon Treaty see E. Herlin-Karnell 
& T. Konstadinides, supra note 16. 
20 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? ??????????????? ??? ??????? ??????????? ??????? 50 Years of European Integration: Foundations and 
Perspectives, The Hague, Netherlands: TMC Asser Press 2009, pp. 157-179. 
21 Case C-77/05 United Kingdom v. Council [2007] I-11459 and § 83 of the Opinion of A. G. Tristenjak 
delivered on 10 July 2007. 
22 Dougan 2009, supra note 19, pp.157-179. 
23 UK and Ireland v Council, Case C-482/08, judgement of 26 October 2010 not yet reported. 
24T. Konstadinides, Division of Powers in European Union Law: The Delimitation of Internal Competence between the 
EU and the Member States, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2009, p. 252. 
25 2010 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union OJ C 326 (2012), Article 328. 
26 ???????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
Purpose of the provisions on closer co-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????
and P. Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty, Oxford: Hart publishing 1999, p. 21. 
27 Convention between Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria, 
signed in Prüm Germany on 27 May 2005. 
28 1985, The Schengen Agreement. OJ L 239 (2000).  
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cross-­border crime and illegal migration.29 This sort of cooperation has, in principle, 
remained outside the scope of the EU Treaty and has therefore been largely 
excluded from the ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
establishing enhanced cooperation have however largely changed through the 
Lisbon Treaty. The enhanced cooperation mechanism represents a particularly 
major change in the field of criminal law. Nevertheless it has not been used to date 
and is closely coupled to the emergency brake mechanism (Articles 82-­83, Treaty of 
the Functioning of the European Union) where a Member State can pull a brake if a 
criminal law proposal is deemed too sensitive from that national criminal law 
perspective. In other words, there are good reasons to believe that any future use of 
the enhanced cooperation within the AFSJ will pose challenges on how to tilt the 
balance between flexibility and fragmentation while also observing the various 
Member States opt out/opt ins. 
   
?????????????????????????? ???????????? ??????????? 
 
The consequence of any opt-­out (that is: not participating in a measure) is that the 
Court of Justice will not have any jurisdiction to monitor the way the Member State 
in question handles the matter it is opting out of. An opt-­out also applies to any 
international agreement concluded by the Union in relation to the cooperation in 
question. In other words, an opt-­out has serious consequences from the perspective 
of the EU project. 
 
As indicated above, the UK and Ireland have negotiated a complete smorgasbord 
approach to the AFSJ project. These Member States have the opportunity to opt out 
of criminal law cooperation provisions as provided by the Lisbon Treaty and 
Protocol Number 21. They can later opt in under the conditions set out in the said 
protocol. Yet in the area of for example the fight against money laundering and 
financial crime it appears less likely that the UK and Ireland would opt out, given 
that it is not only the EU which lies behind these initiatives (that is, the international 
obligations as the guidelines set by the Financial Action Task Force on which the 
????????????????????????? ??????????? ??????????????????????????? ????? ???? ??ast) the 
UK has been one of the leading proponents of further cooperation against money 
laundering across the EU. In addition, the Transitional protocol no. 36 contains 
specific rules which apply only to the UK and under which the UK must decide by 
next year (2014) whether it wishes to participate in the remaining third pillar 
measures at all and whether it accepts the jurisdiction of the Court in this area.30 
Needless to say, this is bound to be a political decision and will complicate the legal 
discussion of the AFSJ. 
 
??.2.1. The Danish Approach: Vi Siger Nej31 
 
Denmark offers a unique test case for the practicality of the AFSJ project. Protocol 
no. 22 as attached to the Lisbon Treaty grants Denmark a special position by 
                                                 
29 See generally House of Lords European Union Committee 18th Report of Session 2006 ? 
?????????????????????????????????????????????terrorism and crime??? available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldeucom/90/90.pdf 
(accessed 1 June 2011). 
30 See J. Piris, The Lisbon Treaty, A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010, 
pp. 199-200; as well as P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Law, Politics and Treaty Reform, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2010, p. 341.  
31 ???????????????????????????????????? 
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granting it the right to remain outside the project. This protocol means that 
Denmark participates in Schengen-­related measures and Pre-­Lisbon third pillar 
instruments on the basis of international law, which continues to be binding and 
applicable to Denmark as before, even if these acts are amended. Denmark may 
however notify the other Member States that it wishes to join the EU criminal law 
venture. As noted by Suominen, this means that Denmark could decide to opt in to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ng in/or out 
with respect to each new criminal law measure.32 ???????????????????????????????????
the entire concept. Likewise, amendments of pre-­Lisbon instruments do not apply 
to Denmark and the old version will continue to apply. Notoriously, ever since the 
Maastricht Treaty, Denmark has had some serious objections to the EU project. 
The well-­known referendum in connection with the entry into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty was perhaps the trendsetter to later referenda in France, 
Netherlands and Ireland. Perhaps it is worth recalling that in accordance with the 
Danish protocol attached to the previous Amsterdam Treaty, Denmark was exempt 
from almost all measures adopted within the framework of former title IV of the old 
EC Treaty. In addition, Denmark had special rules in place regarding the Schengen 
acquis.33 These rules are now transferred to and bundled together in one document 
under the regime provided by Lisbon, namely protocol no. 22. When the Lisbon 
Treaty was being negotiated the Danish government set out to hold a referendum on 
the Danish opt-­outs but such plans were ultimately abandoned.34  
 
In short, the Danish position is as follows. As for AFSJ measures which build upon 
the Schengen acquis and also fall within the scope of Title V of the TFEU, 
Denmark has six months to decide whether to apply each such measure in its 
national law.35 Unlike the UK and Ireland it does not have the option to opt back in. 
According to Article 8 in the Protocol no. 22, Denmark may at any time, in 
accordance with its constitutional requirements, inform the other Member States 
that it no longer wishes to avail itself of all or part of this Protocol. In that event, 
Denmark will apply in full all relevant measures then in force taken within the 
framework of the EU. Yet Denmark is not participating in any of the criminal law 
cooperation set out in Article 82-­86 TFEU. Denmark is excluded unless the 
measures in question also build upon the Schengen acquis. So the relationship 
between Denmark and all other Member States in the EU (except the UK and Irish 
opt-­outs) will then be based on intergovernmental cooperation and Council of 
Europe Treaties such as most prominently the European Convention of Human 
Rights standards (which will create an interesting situation when the EU accedes to 
the ECHR, and of course the convention rights are already binding to the EU).  
 
However, interestingly, in connection with the implementation of the European 
Arrest Warrant (EAW),36 Denmark was praised by the Commission for having 
implemented the Framework decision in time, in contrast to many other Member 
States.37 Indeed, studies of the implementation in Denmark revealed that Danish 
                                                 
32 ??????????????EU criminal law cooperation before and after the Lisbon Treaty ? aspects and comments 
especially in ????????????????????????????????????????2012, pp. 573?604. 
33 Peers 2012, supra note 2; Hinarejos, Spencer and Peers 2012, supra note 2, p. 674. 
34 See Report ???????????????????????????????????????????????????The Danish Opt Outs from the European 
?????????????????????????????????at Folketing (Danish Parliament) website: http://www.eu-
oplysningen.dk/emner_en/forbehold/. 
35 Peers 2012, supra note 2; Hinarejos, Spencer and Peers 2012, supra note 2, p. 674 
36 2002 The European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision, OJ L 190/1.  
37 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ????????????????????????????????
Scandinavian Studies in Law 2009-54, p. 431. 
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legal practice has supported the operation of this instrument. Against the backdrop 
of the history of this instrument, and in particular the severe criticism it has received 
from human rights advocates, this might seems somewhat paradoxical. After all, 
many national courts have had problems with this instrument, among them the 
German Federal Constitutional Court. In a nutshell, and to cut a long story short, the 
EAW was highly controversial when it was adopted in 2002 as it abolished dual criminality 
for a list of 32 categories of crimes and introduced the concept of mutual recognition in the 
AFSJ.38 And it still causes controversy in some national legal systems. Therefore it might 
seem that a change of attitude in Demark (at least at the political level) with regard to EU 
criminal law cooperation has occurred. In addition, it appears as if the decision-making 
process is the most decisive factor for Denmark when considering any cooperation at the 
EU level.39 
 
Much less controversial then, in the view of the Scandinavians, is the Nordic 
criminal law sphere. 
 
???. Nordic Criminal Law Cooperation: Denmark is in 
 
The Nordic arrest warrant offers an interesting example of successful criminal law 
cooperation based on mutual recognition and the notion of trust among the Nordic countries. 
For example, this instrument goes further than the much-debated EAW in that it completely 
abolishes dual criminality for all crimes within the Nordic states. Moreover, unlike the EAW, 
where the maximum punishment prescribes at least 12 months imprisonment in the 
sentencing scale, there is no such threshold with regard to the Nordic warrant. Consequently, 
there is also a much higher level of trust within the Nordic sphere as compared to the wider 
EU area. So far so good, but conceivably there could arrive a time when a Swedish person 
refuses to be surrendered to Denmark because Denmark is not part of the judicial safeguards 
adopted under Article 82, Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. This could for 
example concern the proposed Directive on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal 
proceedings and on the right to communicate upon arrest, which would then not be 
applicable to Swedish suspects facing justice in Denmark.40 Be that as is may, the Nordic club 
has always had very similar criminal law systems and in the near future this might not be a 
problem. But theoretically, and in any case in the long run it remains highly disturbing that 
not all the Scandinavian countries are parties to the same legal instrument for the protection 
of the individual in cross-border criminal law proceedings. And yet the reverse side of the 
coin is perhaps the most difficult question regarding why the EU should be involved in Nordic 
criminal law cooperation at all. Yet given the number of third pillar instruments already in 
place and already part of the Nordic enforcement machinery, it appears to be too late to 
ask this question. The Scandinavian countries were always proponents of the third 
pillar regime and saw it as a way of avoiding increased repression in criminal law and 
less supranational involvement.41 Indeed, Denmark was the initiative-­taker behind the 
Framework decision on criminal law penalties against environmental damages, the 
very initiative that encouraged the Commission to take action resulting in the famous 
case on Environmental crimes where criminal law was moved to the supranational 
EU.42 
                                                 
38 See e.g. M. Fichera, The implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in the European Union Law, Policy and 
Practice, Antwerp: Intersentia 2011. 
39 Suominen 2012, supra note 32, pp. 573?604. 
40 2001 Proposal for a Directive on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right 
to communicate upon arrest COM, 326.  
41 ???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????EJCCLCJ 2009, 
p. 191. 
42 Commission v Council Case C-176/03, judgment 13 September 2005, ECR I-7879. 
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The relationship between Nordic cooperation and the Danish opt-­out to the AFSJ is 
highly unclear. In particular it remains unclear how the Court of Justice will deal with 
the situation. In addition, it remains unclear whether the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (the Charter) could function as a rebuttal here for Swedish or Finnish nationals 
being surrendered to Denmark and where, for example and very hypothetically, 
Denmark was to have a disproportionately high penalty that would breach the rights 
under Article 49 of the Charter. How will mutual recognition work at all if not all 
Member states are participating? Clearly, it challenges the very point of it. 
 
Another issue worth considering with regard to the protection of Danish citizens is 
that of Data Protection, which is a Treaty-­based right in Article 16 TFEU and Article 
8 of the Charter. Data Protection is often at risk in the context of crime fighting. In 
the Stockholm programme it is repeatedly stressed43 that the notion of data protection 
needs to be strengthened. More specifically, it is stated that the Union must ensure 
that the fundamental right to data protection is consistently applied and that the 
Union must therefore respond to the challenge posed by the increasing exchange of 
citizens' personal data and the need to ensure the protection of privacy. The most 
important change in this regard is the inclusion of Article 16 TFEU in the Lisbon 
Treaty. This provision makes it clear that everyone has the right to the protection of 
personal data. In addition, Declaration 2144 states that specific rules on the protection 
of personal data and the free movement of such data in the fields of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation based on Article 16 TFEU 
may prove necessary in view of the specific nature of these fields. Interestingly, it has 
been suggested that Article 16 TFEU is drafted in a way that echoes citizenship.45 It is 
true that Framework Decision 2008/97746 still applies in this area but it is not as far-­
reaching as Article 16 TFEU. So even if Denmark is not part of EU criminal law 
cooperation it still has to safeguard the protection of data. This is therefore an area 
with an interesting future. The right to data protection, and by extension citizenship 
rights, need to be balanced against the need to fight crime effectively, as well as against 
questions o?? ????????? ???????????? ?????????????? ??????? ??? ??? ????? ??? ??????????? ????
?????????? ????? ?????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ????? ??? ???????????? ????? ??????? ??? ????
process guarantees and where the reach of the Charter could become the turning 
point with regard to the general application of fundamental rights beyond title V of 
the TFEU. 
A further issue of importance is the reach of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
which will also still apply to Denmark whether it participates in EU criminal law or 
not, and which could have a spill-­over effect on national law (if there is any EU law 
????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????Stefano 
Melloni,47 on the validity of the amendments made to the EAW by Framework 
                                                 
43 2009 The Stockholm programme ? An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizen, 
Council of the European Union, p. 10. 
44 Declaration 21 attached to the Lisbon Treaty. 
45 See H. Hijmans and A. Scirocco???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????Common Market Law Review 2009-46, p.1485, see also E De Busser 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???, E Herlin-Karnell, ?Is the 
???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? Spaventa (eds) Empowerment and 
Disempowerment of the European Citizen, Hart publishing, Oxford 2012, ch 9  
46 2008/977 Framework Decision, on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters OJ L 350, P. 0060 - 0071. 
47 Criminal proceedings against Stefano Melloni, Case C-399/11, Opinion of AG Bot delivered on 2 October 
2012.  
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Decision 2009/299/JHA,48 and addressing the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to trial in absentia, Advocate General Bot provided an interesting account 
of the relationship between the EAW and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The 
Advocate General focused on Article 53 of the Charter, which provides for the 
highest relevant human rights standard to be applied. In doing so, he argued that the 
Charter is not, in any event, a primacy-­restricting measure and does not empower the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????rt of Justice agreed and held that such an 
interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter would undermine the principle of the primacy of 
EU law. Specifically, the Court stated that where an EU legal act calls for national 
implementing measures, national authorities and courts remain free to apply national 
standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided 
for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of 
EU law are not thereby compromised.49 It could be argued though that Article 53 of the 
Charter does not hinder the EU in adopting a higher standard. 
The interesting question in the present context is what would happen if the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) ? which Denmark is party to ? provides for a 
higher standard with regard to human rights protection. To find out whether this is 
the case would require an extensive reading of the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), which is beyond the scope of the present article. Needless to 
say, the AFSJ is still a work in progress.50  
Conclusion 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the phenomenon of European involvement in the AFSJ field. In doing so the paper 
has focussed on the meaning of the Danish non-­participation in this area. The paper 
?????? ????????? ??????????? ?????????????? ???????????????????????? ??? ??? ???? ????????? ????
UK and Irish opt-­outs. In addition, the paper set out to look at the multifaceted rules 
on flexibility in order to paint the broader picture of what is actually at stake when 
discussing the phenomenon of multi-­speed Europe.   
 
???? ??? ??? ????? ?? ??????? ???? ???????? ????? ????? ????????????? ???????? ???? ????? ??????
unless it participates fully. Not participating is different from being a proponent of 
subsidiarity-­influenced approaches to EU law or the recognition of national identity as 
well as pluralistic views. 51 There is always a balance to be struck between flexibility and 
fragmentation. But these notions are only relevant, as is the establishment of the 
enhanced cooperation mechanisms, when Member States operate at different speeds 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
raids from England to Turkey. It is said that during this old Viking era, when the 
Vikings reached England, the English got off their horses to fight standing while the 
Vikings rode over them. There were different conceptions of fair play then, long 
before the concepts of EU harmonisation or conflict of laws were invented. This 
                                                 
48 2009/299 Framework Decision on the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial, OJ 
L81/24. 
49 Criminal proceedings against Stefano Melloni, Case C-399/11, judgment of 26 February 2013, § 60.  
50 E. Herlin-??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ?????????European Law Review, 2013,-1. 
51 For a very interesting contribution saying the opposite to what this paper is arguing with regard to the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-????????????????? ??????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????West European Politics 2011, p. 
1092. 
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golden period did not last long and the Vikings had to leave. The Danes stopped 
looking west and turned east and north instead. Scandinavia is now a peaceful club of 
states and the Nordic cooperation works smoothly. Why do they need the EU for a 
successful justice and home affairs cooperation? This is something Denmark must 
ask itself by looking beyond nationalistic slogans.  
